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Duty of care is a critical component of any negligence claim 
necessary to establish liability.  It is well recognized at common 
law that a physician owes a duty to advise a patient but is not 
mandated to take affirmative measures outside the physician-
patient relationship to protect a third-party.  Health care 
providers may also be responsible for oversight, or the failure to 
safeguard a patient, due to a special relationship they undertake, 
such as failing to properly diagnose or recommend an 
appropriate treatment plan.  Recently, the courts have struggled 
over whether public policy and fairness require the expansion of 
the law to impose liability upon health care providers for injuries 
sustained by third parties caused by patients in motor vehicle 
accidents. 
 
Various theories are advanced to establish liability, such as 
the physician being negligent by violating a statute created to 
protect the public through negligence per se, establishing prima 
facie negligence, or offering evidence of carelessness. A clear court 
consensus has failed to emerge whether the common law should 
be expanded in favor of responsibility.  This article will provide 
a brief history of the efforts to enlarge physician liability to third 
parties.  It will then focus on the cases that have arisen against 
physicians by a third party injured in a motor vehicle accident 
related to a patient’s medical condition or medication side-effects.  
This is a dilemma confronting the courts on a regular basis. 
 
 K.R. was a troubled soul who suffered from depression, 
recreational drug use, and questionable seizures.1  Several 
physicians prescribed various pharmaceuticals, some of which 
are known to cause drowsiness.2  She was told not to drive, but 
this was not a significant concern because her boyfriend took her 
 
1. K.R. is the driver’s initials who caused the accident, and a pseudonym 
to protect her confidentiality because of a civil commitment.  Bland v. K.R., No. 
A-1837-18T1, 2020 WL 2510361, at *1 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 
2020). 
2. Id. at *4. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/4
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everywhere.3 
On the day in question, K.R. saw a mental health counselor 
and reported that she had “a history of blackouts and some 
seizure episodes.”4  K.R. was referred for a substance abuse 
evaluation and diagnosed with depression and “many medical 
issues.”5  The patient left the facility, went to work, and then 
met a friend at a restaurant; as she was driving home, she 
drifted into the opposite lane of travel and struck the plaintiff’s 
car, causing severe injuries.6  K.R. pled guilty to unsafe driving, 
and the injured motorist sued a variety of parties including 
K.R.’s healthcare providers.7  The pleading alleged that the 
physicians were negligent in not reporting the woman to the 
New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission because she had 
recurrent episodes of unconsciousness, or impairment of driving 
abilities.8  The relevant statute provides that any physician 
treating a patient for convulsive seizures, recurrent periods of 
unconsciousness, or motor coordination impairment must report 
that determination to the Director of the Division of Motor 
Vehicles within twenty-four hours.9 
The trial judge dismissed the complaint noting that the 
statute does not provide a private cause of action but merely 
imposes a fine on the offending physician.10  That failure to 
report a seizure was also not the proximate cause of the 
accident.11  The New Jersey Appellate Court agreed and opined 
that foreseeability is a critical component of a cause of action for 
negligence.12  Once this element is established, the court must 
consider the fairness and policy considerations involved in 
deciding whether the imposition of a duty is warranted.13  This 
determination is fact-specific and must lead to a fair and proper 
disposition of the case.14  However, a violation of the statute 
 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at *3. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at *1. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:3-10.4 (2014). 
10. Bland, 2020 WL 2510361, at *5. 
11. Id. 
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offers no foundation for a claim of negligence against a medical 
care professional; it also does not generate a separate basis for a 
common law claim for medical negligence.15 
This 2020 appellate court decision is just one of the latest 
attempts to overturn the law that fails to extend a physician’s 
duty to an injured third party who is not a patient.  For decades, 
this controversy has smoldered as the medical and legal 
communities struggle over whether policy and fairness 
considerations mandate the expansion of the law to impose 
liability upon a healthcare provider for injuries sustained by a 
third party that were foreseeable. 
The first deviation of the rule occurred in 1976 when a 
California court imposed a duty upon a mental health 
professional to a third person when the analyst learned that a 
patient would harm a specific person.16  The next shoe to drop 
involved the expanded liability of a physician to a third party 
after exposure to a communicable disease due to the doctor’s 
failure to report the positive results or the doctor’s negligent 
explanation of the test’s outcome.17  The most recent attempt to 
expand a physician’s liability involves injuries sustained by 
innocent third parties in motor vehicle accidents due to a 
medical condition of or a medication prescribed to the offending 
driver.18  This article will provide a brief history of the efforts to 
enlarge physician liability to third parties.  It will then focus on 
an analysis of the cases that have arisen to overturn the common 
law doctrine of no liability to a third party injured by a patient 
in a motor vehicle accident, in which the side-effects of 
medication played a role. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The threshold question in a negligence case is whether there 
was a duty owed.  The claimant must demonstrate both the 
requirement of and breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff by the 
offending party, therefore creating tort liability.19  It is well 
 
15. Id. at *7. 
16. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
17. E.g., Doe v. Cochran, 210 A.3d 469 (Conn. 2019). 
18. Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323 (Tenn. 2003). 
19. Collective Asset Partners LLC v. Schaumburg, 432 S.W.3d 435, 440 
(Tex. App. 2014). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/4
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recognized at common law that a physician owes a duty to advise 
a patient, but is not mandated to take affirmative measures 
outside the physician-patient relationship to shield a third-
party.20  Physicians may also be liable for oversight, or the 
failure to safeguard a patient, due to a special relationship of 
care they undertake, such as failing to correctly diagnose or 
recommend a proper treatment plan.  The usual criterion for 
assessing a physician’s actions is the appropriate medical care 
standard.21  As noted in Rebollal v. Payne: 
 
A physician and a health-related facility owe a 
duty of care to their patients and to persons they 
knew or reasonably should have known were 
relying on them for this service to the patient. 
However, the physician or health-related facility 
does not undertake a duty to the public at large.22 
 
The duty to be responsible for malpractice to the patient is 
based upon an expressed or implied contract that the physician 
would treat the patient with the appropriate and necessary 
professional skill.23  For example, physicians frequently deliver 
medical services in situations that do not always result in a 
doctor-patient relationship.24  The classic example is the 
independent medical examination, whereby the physician 
examines a person on behalf of an insurance carrier or defense 
attorney.25  Doctors also conduct physicals at an employers’ 
request or assess applicants’ health for life and disability 
insurance policies.26  Most states fail to recognize a doctor-
patient relationship in these contexts and will not allow the 
examinee to sue the presiding physician for malpractice.27  This 
is demonstrated in Smith v. Radecki, where the Alaska Supreme 
Court did not permit the plaintiff to pursue a medical 
 
20. Seebold v. Prison Health Servs., 57 A.3d 1232, 1238 n.6 (Pa. 2012). 
21. Id. at 1247. 
22. Rebollal v. Payne, 536 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). 
23. 3 SUMM. PA. JUR. 2D TORTS Physician’s Liability to Third Person § 
37:54, Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2021). 
24. Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. et al., A Guide to the Independent Medical 
Examination, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 341 (2015). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 348. 
5
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malpractice claim against an independent medical examiner 
(“IME”) doctor for failing to discover the underlying cause of his 
back problems.28 The defendant determined there were no 
permanent injuries related to the work-related incident, advised 
against additional treatment, and suggested psychological 
therapy and weight loss.29  About one year later, an MRI 
disclosed a sacral cyst that was compressing the nerves at the 
base of his spine. 30  The employee sued the doctor for medical 
malpractice for failing to diagnose and treat his back.31  The 
lawsuit was dismissed, and the appellate court affirmed this 
decision.32  The court ruled that the physician could not be held 
liable because, as there was no doctor-patient relationship, there 
was no corresponding duty of care.33 
II. DUTY OWED BY MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
The scope of a patient’s right to confidentiality has been the 
subject of debate since the time of Hippocrates, with some 
advocating for complete disclosure and others pressing for 
unconditional secrecy.34  After all, confidentiality fosters open 
discussions between parties that are protected from disclosure.35  
The foundations of this secrecy and the duty owed to a third 
party in a mental health setting were rocked in the 1976 seminal 
decision of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.36  
This matter involved a patient who informed a University 
psychotherapist that he would kill a woman he encountered at a 
dance class when she returned from another country.37  The 
University police briefly detained that individual at the 
therapist’s request, but later released him after he promised to 
keep away from the young woman.38  Tragically, he followed 
 
28. Smith v. Radecki, 238 P.3d 111, 112 (Alaska 2010). 
29. Id. at 113. 
30. Id. at 112. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 114, 117. 
33. Id. 
34. See Ahmad Adi & Mohammad Mathbout, The Duty to Protect: Four 
Decades After Tarasoff, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 6, 6 (2018). 
35. See id. 
36. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
37. Id. at 339. 
38. Id. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/4
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through on his threat and murdered the young woman upon her 
return to the country.39 
A lawsuit was instituted by the young woman’s parents 
claiming that the mental health worker had a duty to warn the 
woman of the imminent danger posed by the patient.40  The 
defendant maintained that confidential communication is vital 
to mental health treatment, and any information revealed 
during a meeting must be held in the strictest confidence.41  The 
court disagreed and determined the policy supporting 
confidential discussions must acquiesce in favor of disclosure 
when necessary to prevent immediate harm to a third party; the 
privilege of protection must terminate when a public peril 
starts.42  As the court noted: 
 
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed 
in such a position with regard to another . . . that 
if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own 
conduct . . . he would cause danger of injury to the 
person or property of the other, a duty arises to 
use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.43 
 
The court opined that it will depart from the standard tort 
principles only upon offsetting factors such as the foreseeability 
of harm to a third party, the extent of certainty that the victim 
suffered injury, the relationship between the assailant’s conduct 
and the harm posed/suffered, the moral blame attached to that 
conduct, “the policy of preventing future harm,” the scope of the 
burden to the wrongdoer, and the significance to the community 
of enforcing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for the 
breach.44  As noted in both the Restatement (Second) of Torts45 
and Prosser on Torts,46 there is an exception to the general rule 
of no liability to a third person when the mental health 




41. Id. at 346. 
42. Id. at 347. 
43. Id. at 342 (citation omitted). 
44. Id. at 358. 
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
46. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971). 
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patient whose actions must be controlled or in a relationship to 
the foreseeable victim of that conduct.47 
This duty to warn is dubbed the “Tarasoff Rule” and 
requires mental health workers to exercise “reasonable care” to 
notify the authorities or warn possible victims should they learn 
that a patient presents a threat to a third person.48 The duty to 
protect third parties has broad implications, and the holding 
reinforces the principle that a doctor’s obligation of 
confidentiality is not absolute.49  The California legislature 
subsequently refined the reach of Tarasoff by enacting a law 
which imposes no financial responsibility against a 
psychotherapist who fails to warn an individual who is 
threatened by aggressive conduct unless the patient informs the 
therapist of a serious threat of physical harm against a 
reasonably identifiable victim.50 
This particular decision has become one of the most 
discussed cases in modern tort law, and the courts and 
legislatures have broadly embraced it as the basis for creating 
an obligation upon mental health professionals to “warn, control, 
and/or protect potential victims of their patients who have 
expressed violent intentions.”51  An increased focus on this duty 
has recently emerged due to the mass shootings in Aurora, 
Colorado and Newtown, Connecticut.  For example, New York 
has enacted legislation that imposes a mandatory obligation on 
mental health professionals to report whenever they think 
patients may present a risk to themselves or others.52  Further, 
such professionals are not subject to liability for the failure to 
 
47. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343. 
48. Adi & Mathbout, supra note 33, at 6. 
49. Id. 
50. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2012).  This statute further states 
that no monetary liability shall arise against a psychotherapist who, under the 
circumstances of subsection (a) of the statute, discharges their duty to protect 
by making a reasonable effort to notify the victim(s) and a law enforcement 
agency.  Id.  In 2004, the California Court of Appeals extended the Tarasoff 
holding to cases where a member of the patient’s family told the therapist that 
the patient has made a serious threat against a third person.  Ewing v. 
Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
51. Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 98 (1994). 
52. See Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-
health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.46 
(McKinney 2013). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/4
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report this type of conduct if they act “in good faith” and if the 
police are permitted to remove firearms from the patients’ 
possession.53 
The range of disclosure requirements among the various 
states is astounding.54  Twenty-three jurisdictions have 
statutorily required reporting laws,55 eleven states must warn 
at common-law,56 ten states (and Washington D.C.) are 
permissive concerning the duty to warn,57 and six states offer no 
guidance regarding the Tarasoff warnings.58 
III. THE SECOND WAVE OF CASES ESTABLISHING A DUTY TO 
WARN 
Many lawsuits have been filed since Tarasoff with the goal 
of expanding health care providers’ liability to third parties.  
These efforts have received mixed success, but a few areas have 
gained traction.  At the root of many of these cases is a policy 
associated with social and economic considerations.  As noted by 
Dean Prosser in his description of proximate or legal causation: 
 
Once it is established that the defendant’s conduct 
has in fact been one of the causes of the plaintiff’s 
injury, there remains the question whether the 
defendant should be legally responsible for what 
he has caused.  Unlike the fact of causation, with 
which it is often hopelessly confused, this is 
essentially a problem of law.  It is sometimes said 
 
53. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.46(b), (d). 
54. See Olga Gorshkalova & Sunil Munakomi, Duty to Warn, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Sept. 5, 2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK542236/. 
55. Jurisdictions in this category include Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.  Id. 
56. Jurisdictions in this category include Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Iowa, North Carolina, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
57. Jurisdictions in this category include Alaska, Connecticut, 
Washington D.C., Florida, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming.  Id. 
58. Jurisdictions in this category include Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, 
Nevada, New Mexico, and North Dakota.  Id. 
9
158 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  41.2 
to be a question of whether the conduct has been 
so significant and important a cause that the 
defendant should be legally responsible.  But both 
significance and importance turn upon 
conclusions in terms of legal policy, so that this 
becomes essentially a question of whether the 
policy of the law will extend the responsibility for 
the conduct to the consequences which have in fact 
occurred.59 
 
This thought process has led to the extension of liability to 
a third party when the defendant has a special relationship with 
either the individual whose actions need to be controlled or the 
defendant is in a relationship with the target of the conduct, 
which affords the victim a right to protection.60 
A. Communicable Diseases 
The duty to warn has been recognized by the courts in the 
context of contagious diseases, in which a cause of action has 
been allowed by a third party who has been injured by the 
doctor’s actions.61  It is a basic principle that individuals owe a 
duty to employ reasonable care to abstain from conduct that will 
foreseeably injure others.62  Many infectious diseases can be 
transmitted through normal behaviors, and individual members 
of society may be particularly susceptible to exposure and 
unfavorable health consequences.63  This risk has resulted in a 
physician being held liable to those infected by a patient if the 
physician negligently fails to properly diagnose an infectious 
process or has identified the malady but neglects to warn others 
within the foreseeable range of exposure to the disease.64 
 
59. Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hosp., Inc., 465 A.2d 1231, 1233 (Pa. 1983) 
(quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1978)). 
60. See generally Emerich v. Phila. Ctr. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032 
(Pa. 1998). 
61. See id. at 1038. 
62. Doe v. Linder Constr. Co., 845 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1992). 




64. See id. at *2; Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1984). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/4
2021 LIABILITY OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 159 
The proper way of fulfilling this obligation to warn, and 
avoiding liability, is influenced by appropriate reporting and 
privacy laws.  Some maintain that the patient’s confidentiality 
is best safeguarded through indirect warnings provided to the 
health department.  However, this method may be unproductive 
in states where the health agency does not warn those exposed 
to communicable diseases such as HIV.65  A human 
immunodeficiency virus presents a particular problem because 
the danger of contact is well-defined and direct, but people may 
be hesitant to be tested if they know somebody will inform 
acquaintances.66  As a result, case law imposes a duty to issue a 
warning to prevent harm to others.67 
Doe v. Cochran provides an example of this situation.68  In 
this case, the court ruled that a doctor who incorrectly tells a 
patient that he does not have a sexually transmitted disease 
may be liable to the patient’s partner for the resulting harm 
when the physician is aware that the person requested testing 
for the direct benefit of that partner.69  As noted, a person owes 
a duty to act with “due care in one’s affirmative conduct with 
respect to all people, insofar as one’s negligent actions may 
foreseeably harm them.”70  Based upon the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts: 
 
One who negligently gives false information to 
another is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused by action taken by the other in reasonable 
reliance upon such information, where such harm 
results . . . to such third persons as the actor 




65. See Edward P. Richards & Katharine C. Rathbun, Warning Third 
Parties, in LAW AND THE PHYSICIAN: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1993) (ebook). 
66. See Laura Lin & Bryan A. Liang, HIV and Health Law: Striking the 
Balance Between Legal Mandates and Medical Ethics, 7 AM. MED. ASS’N J. 
ETHICS 687, 688 (2005). 
67. See id. 
68. Doe v. Cochran, 210 A.3d 469 (Conn. 2019). 
69. Id. at 472. 
70. Id. at 478. 
71. Id. at 481 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (AM. L. INST. 
1965)). 
11
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In this case, the partner was a foreseeable victim of the 
physician’s negligence to an identifiable person. 
This ruling is consistent with several other jurisdictions 
that have found a medical professional’s obligation to accurately 
diagnose and properly inform a patient who has an infectious 
disease encompasses not only the patient but also third persons 
who may foreseeably develop that disease from the patient.72  
This principle is not draconian or unforeseeable.  Many courts 
have long found that health care providers owe a duty of care to 
members of the infected patient’s immediate family.73 
In the context of HIV, state laws are inconsistent as to 
whether a patient’s status can be shared with others.  Several 
jurisdictions have laws dealing with notifying contacts of HIV 
exposure, and certain health departments mandate that if a 
patient declines to report a companion who may have been 
exposed, the physician must inform the appropriate 
governmental agency of any partner of whom the doctor is 
aware.74  Some states also have laws requiring a duty to warn, 
thereby mandating disclosure by the health care provider to 
others known to be at substantial danger for future HIV 
transmission from patients identified as being infected.75 
In Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt University, a woman 
received blood transfusions during surgery, but she was never 
told the transfusion could expose her to the HIV virus.76  
Subsequently, the patient gave birth to a daughter infected with 
HIV who died from complications related to the virus.  The 
woman and her husband subsequently filed suit against the 
hospital, the defendant’s summary judgment motion was 
granted, and an appeal followed.77  The appellate court noted a 
 
72. Id. at 485; see 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers 
§ 226, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2021); Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. 
Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIV/AIDS and Other Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner 
Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 9, 37 (1998); Tracy A. Bateman, 
Liability of Doctor or Other Health Practitioner to Third Party Contracting 
Contagious Disease from Doctor's Patient, 3 A.L.R. 5th § 2(a) (1992); 43 AM. 
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Physician’s Failure to Protect Third Party From Harm 
by Nonpsychiatric Patient § 3, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020). 
73. See Cochran, 210 A.3d at 485. 
74. Lin & Liang, supra note 64, at *2. 
75. Id. 
76. Est. of Amos v. Vanderbilt Univ., 62 S.W.3d 133, 135 (Tenn. 2001). 
77. Id. at 135–36. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/4
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recognized concept that “a physician may owe a duty to a non-
patient third party if the physician’s negligence causes 
reasonably foreseeable injuries to the third party.”78  In finding 
for the plaintiffs, the court stated that the duty envisioned is to 
warn the patient of the HIV risk in order for the patient to take 
proper measures to avoid transmission of the virus to both her 
husband and child.79  The defendant’s breach of that duty 
resulted in the reasonably foreseeable injuries incurred by the 
deceased infant.80 
B. Genetic Risks 
Genetic testing has implications beyond the patient, such as 
disclosing valuable health information to the person’s 
relatives.81  The failure to share inheritable genetic information 
may “lead to harm, particularly when knowledge could result in 
avoidance, treatment, or prevention of a genetic condition or in 
significant changes to reproductive choices or lifestyle.”82  A 
physician’s duty to inform at-risk relatives of a genetically 
transmittable disease is a troubling question confronting 
physicians who order these tests.83 
Generally, there is no duty on the part of a doctor to warn 
family members of a genetic characteristic unless the patient 
expressly gives permission because another family member 
would be considered a “third party.”  This need to protect genetic 
information relates back to the Hippocratic Oath and is 
reinforced by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act.84 
Recent events have caused the medical profession to 
reconsider traditional ideas of confidentiality and move in favor 
of disclosure.  At-risk relatives have an obvious concern in 
 
78. Id. at 138. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. See Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Does a Physician Have a Duty to Inform At-
Risk Relatives of a Positive Genetic Test When the Patient Refuses to Allow That 
Disclosure?, 16 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 127, 127–52 (2020). 
82. Sara Taub et al., Managing Familial Risk in Genetic Testing, 8 
GENETIC TESTING 356, 358 (2004) (weighing duty to disclose against obligation 
to protect patient confidentiality). 
83. See Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 128. 
84. Id. at 135. 
13
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learning about their health risks, particularly those traits that 
can be reduced through preventive care.85  Florida became the 
first state to consider genetic information disclosure to a non-
patient in Pate v. Threlkel.86  The court framed the issue as 
whether “a physician owe[s] a duty of care to the children of a 
patient to warn the patient of the genetically transferable nature 
of the condition for which the physician is treating the 
patient?”87  The facts reveal that a patient was examined for 
medullary thyroid carcinoma, a genetically transferable disease.  
A few years later, the patient’s daughter was discovered to have 
the same illness.88  As a result, the child sued the physicians who 
had treated her mother, asserting that they knew or should have 
known the patient’s children had the potential of inheriting the 
dangerous malady and that the doctor had an obligation to warn 
the offspring.89 The physicians moved to dismiss the lawsuit, 
maintaining that the plaintiff did not have a doctor-patient 
relationship with them, so they had no duty to inform her.90 The 
lower court concurred and dismissed the claim.91  It found that 
no duty existed because the plaintiff was not in the foreseeable 
zone of risk, and the rules of privity applied.92 
This determination was reversed on appeal.93  The court 
opined that a duty is established if a reasonably prudent 
physician would have informed the patient of a genetically 
communicable illness for which the doctor was treating the 
person.94  In this matter, the standard of care was germane to 
both the patient and her children, who were identifiable third 
parties within the zone of danger.95 However, the court stated 
the duty to warn was satisfied by telling the patient of the risk.96  
 
85. Id. at 138. 
86. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (“[I]n any 
circumstances in which the physician has a duty to warn of a genetically 
transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning the patient.”). 
87. Id. at 279; see Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 128. 
88. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 279. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 279–80. 
91. Id.; Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 143–44. 
92. Pate, 661 So. 2d at 279–80. 
93. Id. at 282. 
94. Id. at 280–82. 
95. Id. at 282. 
96. Id. 
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It noted that its decision should not be construed to require the 
physician to warn at-risk children of the problem.97  After all, 
patients are expected to tell their family members about genetic 
information.98 
New Jersey addressed this issue in Safer v. Estate of Pack.99  
The physician in question treated the plaintiff’s father years 
earlier for retroperitoneal cancer, resulting in a total 
colectomy.100  Subsequently, the father developed ulcerative 
adenocarcinoma with metastases that caused his death.101  
Years later, the plaintiff suffered from abdominal pain and was 
found to have a cancerous blockage of the colon requiring 
surgery and chemotherapy.102  A review of the father’s medical 
records showed that he had the same cancerous malady.103  The 
daughter instituted a suit against her father’s doctor, claiming 
that the physician had a duty to warn those relatives at risk of 
developing the problem since early scrutiny could have 
prevented the inherited cancer outcome.104 
The appellate court ruled that a physician is mandated to 
disclose a genetic condition to those at risk.105  This duty applies 
to the patient and immediate family members who might be 
adversely affected by the breach of that duty.  However, the 
ruling’s impact must be considered in view of ensuing legislation 
passed in New Jersey that provides that genetic information 
may not be revealed except in specific situations such as for 
purposes of a criminal investigation, to ascertain paternity, and 
when authorized by a court order.106  The statute does not 
provide for the sharing of genetic information with at-risk 
relatives without consent.107 
The cases involving the disclosure of genetic information 
 
97. Id. at 282. 
98. Id. 
99. Safer v. Est. of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
100. Id. at 1189. 




105. Id. at 1193. 
106. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-47 (West 1996) (setting conditions for 
disclosure of genetic information). 
107. Id. 
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continued with the Minnesota matter of Molloy v. Meier.108  In 
this litigation, the court was again asked to consider the 
disclosure of genetic information.109  This malpractice lawsuit 
concerned the defendants’ failure to find a genetic abnormality 
in the plaintiffs’ daughter, thereby causing the parents to have 
a second child with the same illness.110  The doctor was asked to 
run genetic tests but did not perform the full complement of 
diagnostic aids.111  The parents then inquired about whether 
another child’s birth would produce an offspring that would be 
mentally delayed, and they were told that the odds of this 
occurring were slim.112 
Based upon that advice, the plaintiffs had another baby who 
showed developmental difficulties.113  Additional testing was 
positive for Fragile X syndrome, and the parents sued the 
defendants asserting that the doctors failed to obtain the proper 
tests, mistakenly noting that the first child had been fully 
tested, and failed to inform the plaintiffs about the possibility of 
passing along an inheritable genetic abnormality to subsequent 
children.114 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, 
asserting that they did not owe a duty to the patient’s family.115 
The court framed the issue on appeal as follows: “Does a 
physician who allegedly fails to test for and diagnose a genetic 
disorder in an existing child leading to the birth of a subsequent 
child with that disorder owe a legal duty to the child’s 
parents?”116  The court found in favor of the plaintiffs and noted 
that genetics affects more than just the patient.117  Both the 
parents and child benefit from appropriate testing, and each can 
be injured by a mistake.  Therefore, a physician’s duty regarding 
genetic testing goes beyond just the patient and extends to the 
biological parents who may be foreseeably harmed by a violation 
of that duty.118 The defendants should have anticipated that 
 
108. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 2004). 
109. See Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 146. 
110. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 713–14. 
111. Id. at 714. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 715. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 716. 
117. Id. at 719. 
118. Id. 
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parents might wish to have another child because of the lack of 
information about a positive genetic disorder.119 
The duty to disclose a genetic risk to a third person is 
similar to the liability imposed against a physician for failing to 
inform non-patient family members about the harm linked to a 
patient with a contagious disease.120  As noted in Molloy v. Meier, 
the court found that “genetic testing and diagnosis does not 
affect only the patient. Both the patient and her family can 
benefit from accurate testing and diagnosis.”121 
C. Independent Medical Examinations 
Jurisdictions have varied approaches in ascertaining 
whether an independent medical examiner owes a duty of care 
to the examinee.  This issue of duties owed is significant because 
it affects whether a claimant can maintain a malpractice or 
other professional negligence suit against the independent 
examiner who was not hired by the patient.122  Most jurisdictions 
hold no doctor-patient relationship is formed, but some courts 
have ruled that an IME doctor owes the patient a limited duty 
i.e., that a doctor-patient relationship does exist.123 
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) started the ball 
rolling when it opined that a physician who conducts an isolated 
examination of a person’s health or disability for an employer, 
business, or insurer should be found to have created a limited 
patient-physician relationship.124  The AMA further noted that 
this limited relationship obliges physicians to tell the patient 
about important health information and suggests that they 
follow up with their own physician.125  However, the IME is not 
obliged to treat the individual like they would handle their 
 
119. Id. 
120. See Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 150. 
121. Molloy, 679 N.W.2d at 719. 
122. See Hodge, Jr., supra note 79, at 149. 
123. Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 23, at 342. 
124. Am. Med. Ass’n, Patient-Physician Relationship in the Context of 
Work-Related and Independent Medical Examinations, Opinion 10.03 (Dec. 
1999), available at  https://www.patrickmalonelaw.com/useful-
information/legal-resources/attorneys/legal-resources-attorneys-injured-
clients/american-medical-association/ (explaining that “isolated assessment[s] 
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patients.126  The AMA also reported that the physician must 
inform the examinee of any abnormalities and other significant 
findings discovered as the result of the physical, including 
making sure that the patient comprehends the issue.127  
Nevertheless, courts have not uniformly adopted the AMA’s 
opinion.128 
Some states do not have a bright-line standard about an 
IME’s duty to examinees.  Instead, they have found that an 
independent examiner owes a limited duty that does not rise to 
the doctor-patient relationship’s standard duty.129  For example, 
the Virginia Supreme Court allowed a plaintiff to defeat a 
motion to dismiss a medical malpractice claim against an 
examiner.130 In Harris v. Kreutzer, the plaintiff sustained a 
brain injury in an automobile accident and sued the other 
driver.131 The trial judge ordered Harris to undergo an 
independent medical examination to assess the extent of her 
brain injury.132  The doctor was a clinical psychologist, and it 
was claimed that he was verbally abusive to the plaintiff and 
accused her of faking the injuries.133  Ms. Harris filed a 
malpractice suit, and the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the 
negligent performance of a physical or mental independent 
medical examination provides a possible cause of action.134  It 
was alleged that the doctor knew that her psychological disorder 
would be exasperated if she were verbally mistreated during the 
exam.135 Herclaim was premised on the allegation that the 
doctor intentionally aggravated her pre-existing problems, 
which he knew of, and as a result of his behavior during the 




128. See Smith v. Radecki, 238 P.3d 111, 115–16 (Alaska 
2010) (discussing the various approaches state courts have taken to the AMA 
rule). 
129. See Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 23, at 344. 
130. Harris v. Kreutzer, 624 S.E.2d 24 (Va. 2006). 
131. Id. at 29–30 (explaining that there “has not been [a] uniform” method 
for determining whether a physician owes a duty to a patient in a court 
ordered medical examination). 
132. Id. at 27. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 33. 
135. Id. at 27. 
136. Id. 
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determined that an independent medical examination does not 
establish the traditional doctor-patient relationship, but rather 
a limited relationship; “[t]he recognition of a limited relationship 
preserves the principle that the IME physician has undertaken 
limited duties but that he has done so in a situation where he is 
‘expected to exercise reasonable care commensurate with his 
experience and training.’”137 
Both Texas and Minnesota courts hold that the independent 
physician owes a limited duty to an examinee to perform the 
examination correctly without causing further harm to the 
patient.138  Likewise, New Jersey has determined that an IME 
owes a duty to the claimant if the physician is examining a 
specific complaint.139  The Fifth Circuit has opined that a doctor 
hired by a third party to perform an examination must tell the 
patient of a potentially life-threatening issue discovered during 
the physical.140  The Ninth Circuit has determined that an IME 
has a duty under Washington law to notify those examined of 
abnormal test findings, even in the absence of the doctor-patient 
relationship.141 
A handful of jurisdictions find that an IME establishes a 
doctor-patient relationship sufficient for a malpractice claim 
against a physician.142  For instance, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that Louisiana law created a doctor-patient 
relationship.143  In Green v. Walker, the decedent’s estate filed a 
claim after the patient died from lung cancer.144  The facts show 
that the deceased had an annual physical, a condition of his 
job.145  The physician found the man to be in good health and 
allowed him to continue working.146  A year later, he was 
diagnosed with lung cancer and subsequently died.147  The 
 
137. Id. at 31 (quoting Dyer v. Trachtman, 679 N.W.2d 311, 316 (Mich. 
2004)). 
138. See Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 23, at 344–45. 
139. Reed v. Bojarski, 764 A.2d 433, 442–43 (N.J. 2001) (holding that pre-
employment medical exams created a duty). 
140. Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 1990). 
141. Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991). 
142. See Hodge, Jr. et al., supra note 23, at 345–47. 
143. Green, 910 F.2d at 296. 
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lawsuit was premised upon the physician’s failure to diagnose 
the deceased’s lung cancer at the employee-mandated 
evaluation.148  The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claim 
because there was no doctor-patient relationship.149 The Fifth 
Circuit disagreed and opined: 
 
We therefore now hold that when an individual is 
required, as a condition of future or continued 
employment, to submit to a medical examination, 
that examination creates a relationship between 
the examining physician and the examinee, at 
least to the extent of the tests conducted.  This 
relationship imposes upon the examining 
physician a duty to conduct the requested tests 
and diagnose the results thereof, exercising the 
level of care consistent with the doctor’s 
professional training and expertise, and to take 
reasonable steps to make information available 
timely to the examinee of any findings that pose 
an imminent danger to the examinee’s physical or 
mental well-being.150 
 
The Kansas courts have found that a doctor hired to conduct 
an independent medical examination must not cause harm 
during the physical and must use her best judgment in 
treatment while relying on her skill and experience.151  In 
Maryland, a claimant must demonstrate that a doctor-patient 
relationship was established to maintain a malpractice claim.152  
The leading case in Maryland held that a doctor-patient 
relationship is established, “only . . . as a result of a contract, 
express or implied, that the doctor will treat the patient with 
proper professional skill and the patient will pay for such 
treatment.”153 
In Webb v. T.D., the Montana Supreme Court ruled that a 
 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 292–93. 
150. Id. at 296. 
151. See Smith v. Welch, 967 P.2d 727, 736 (Kan. 1998). 
152. Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 164 (Md. 2000). 
153. Id. 
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patient could sue her IME doctor for malpractice.154  The court 
framed the issue as “whether a physician who performs a 
medical examination of an individual at the request of a third 
party has a duty of care to the examinee and, if so, what is the 
scope of that duty?”155  The plaintiff hurt her spine in a work-
related incident and was treated by a chiropractor and physical 
therapist.156  The defendant was the only medical doctor she 
saw, and her job’s insurance company employed the physician.157  
That individual ordered a CT scan to determine whether the 
worker had a herniated disk and was told that she did not and 
could return to work.158  The claimant went back to her job only 
to herniate a disc, which caused physical limitations.159  The 
worker filed a malpractice claim against the defendant, who 
moved to dismiss the lawsuit arguing that he was not employed 
to provide any treatment and therefore did not owe a duty 
because there was no doctor-patient relationship.160 
 The Montana Supreme Court disagreed and found that 
when a person is mandated, as a condition of employment, to 
submit to an examination, that physical examination 
establishes a doctor-patient relationship, at least to the degree 
of the tests conducted.161  This connection creates a duty upon 
the doctor to perform the tests and diagnose the results, using 
the care consistent with the doctor’s professional training and 
expertise.162  That duty is not the same as that which is owed in 
the standard doctor-patient relationship, but will be ascertained 
on a case-by-case basis.163  This means that the physician must 
exercise reasonable care to discover conditions that pose an 
imminent danger to the patient’s health, take the necessary 
steps to inform the patient of those conditions, and properly 
notify the patient of his or her status after the examination with 
 
154. Webb v. T.D., 951 P.2d 1008, 1014 (Mont. 1997) (holding that 
Montana law imposed a duty on a doctor performing an IME). 
155. Id. at 1009. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 1009–10. 
158. Id. at 1010. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 1014. 
162. Id. at 1013–14. 
163. Id. at 1014. 
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advice appropriate to the doctor’s profession.164 
IV. PHYSICIAN’S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY 
PATIENTS IN ACCIDENTS 
Informed consent is a critical aspect of shared decision-
making and necessitates that a patient be informed of the 
advantages, risks, and alternatives to any medical procedure.  
This process, which has become part of both the law and practice 
of every physician, helps a patient determine whether to proceed 
with the proposed treatment.165  The doctrine’s basis is the 
ethical idea of patient autonomy and fundamental human 
rights.166  The principle is based upon the benefit that surfaces 
from a person’s active involvement in the decision-making 
process about their health.167  This participation is helpful 
because it aids in preventing treatment that a patient believes 
is disadvantaged or unwarranted.168 
Informed consent has recently gained traction as a way to 
require healthcare providers to warn patients of the side effects 
of dispensed or prescribed medications.169  The courts have 
uniformly recognized the principle as a way to establish a duty 
of care owed to the patient that will give rise to tort liability.170  
However, there is a growing trend to apply the concept to a non-
patient third party to show that a physician was negligent by 
violating a statute created to protect the public through 
negligence per se, establishing prima facie negligence, or 
offering evidence of carelessness.171  In other words, just as 
safety laws create a duty that protects injured parties, informed 
consent may be used to show a duty owed by a healthcare 
provider to a patient that could be applied towards third parties 
 
164. Id. 
165. See Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. & Maria Zambrano Steinhaus, The Ever-
Changing Landscape of Informed Consent and Whether the Obligation to 
Explain a Procedure to the Patient May Be Delegated, 71 ARK. L. REV. 727 
(2019). 
166. Id. at 727–28. 
167. Id. at 729. 
168. Id. 
169. See 43 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Physician’s Failure to Protect 
Third Party From Harm by Nonpsychiatric Patient § 1, Westlaw (database 
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injured by that patient.172  This is demonstrated by a series of 
cases dealing with physician liability to a third party injured by 
a patient-driver who was impaired by a medical problem or 
prescription drugs.173 
These matters usually involve control and foreseeability 
issues, and the “cases lend themselves to a public policy 
analysis.”174  The courts like to apply a balancing test when 
confronting questions about expanding a physician’s liability to 
a third party.  This requires the court to evaluate the probability 
of injury in similar matters, to weigh the doctor’s burden to 
guard against liability, and to examine the possible concerns of 
putting that burden on the doctor.175  The courts will also 
consider the concept of fairness; an unreasonable risk is present 
if “the foreseeable probability and gravity of harm posed by 
defendant’s conduct outweigh the burden upon the defendant to 
engage in alternative conduct that would have prevented the 
harm.”176  When it comes to prescribing drugs, the obligation to 
inform a patient of the risks related to taking medication while 
operating a motor vehicle presents little to no burden upon a 
doctor when associated with the degree of harm that the 
warning may prevent to a third party.177 
Overall, courts are split over whether to extend a 
physician’s liability in these cases.  The soundest situation for 
establishing a duty of care for medication, epilepsy, and similar 
conditions occurs when the doctor creates an unreasonable risk 
to a third party by negligently risking harm to the patient.  This 
is demonstrated by a patient who is permitted to operate a car, 
but because of the physician’s issuance of unneeded or 
unsuitable medication, the driver becomes drowsy and strikes 
the plaintiff’s vehicle.  Some courts have recognized a duty of 
 
172. Id. 
173. See Dean P. Nicastro, Physician Liability to Non-Patients: Coombes 
v. Florio, 450 Mass. 182 (2007), 52 BOS. BAR J. 20 (2008). 
174. Reply Brief of Appellee at 27, Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 
2004) (No. 1011673). 
175. See id.; Lance v. Senior, 224 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. 1967); Boyd v. Racine 
Currency Exch., Inc., 306 N.E.2d 39 (Ill. 1973). 
176. Campbell C. Steele, Comment, Torts-Burroughs v. Magee: The 
Tennessee Supreme Court Extends a Physician’s Duty to the Motoring Public to 
Warn Patients of the Effects of Taking Medication While Driving but Declines 
to Extend a Duty to Third Parties for Negligent Prescription Decisions, 35 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 173, 176–77 (2004) (citations omitted). 
177. See id. at 195. 
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care to a third party in such situations.178  Likewise, the 
healthcare provider may be liable for carelessly failing to 
discover a patient’s epilepsy, to warn the medicated patient 
against driving, or to inform the patient-driver the 
contraindicated drug given by a doctor incapacitates when 
driving.179  While a physician may owe a duty to foreseeable 
third persons to inform a patient of the “risks of driving while 
under the influence of [] prescribed drugs,” that obligation is not 
always owed to foreseeable third persons when electing to 
prescribe pharmaceuticals to a patient.180  Needless to say, 
physicians and medical organizations are strenuously opposed 
to the expansion of liability to cover third parties injured 
because of medication use by patients,181 and several courts 
agree with this position.182  Some jurisdictions merely refuse to 
extend liability to non-patients.183  Others opine that creating a 
duty to non-patients will create a conflict between a physician’s 
responsibilities to a patient and obligations to third parties.184  
However, these positions are not applicable when the doctor’s 
duty of care requires an identical diagnosis or treatment that 
would also be safer for society members.185  In such a case, there 
is neither a clash of allegiance nor any further imposition upon 
the doctor; she fulfills her obligation to a third person when she 
meets her duty to the patient.186 
Most individuals handle prescription medication with care.  
Pharmaceuticals have side effects because of their chemical 
structure that may influence a person’s capacity to engage in 
 
178. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 149–52 (2d ed. 2011) 
(discussing § 289 regarding the risk to strangers when physicians fail to 
properly warn or treat their patients). 
179. See id.; see also Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887 (Ala. 2004); Cheeks 
v. Dorsey, 846 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (methadone 
allegedly issued to patient already on drugs, causing an incapacity that 
resulted in a car accident that killed the plaintiff's decedent and her child). 
180. Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 333–35 (Tenn. 2003). 
181. See Chris Mazzolini, Physician Found Liable for Malpractice for 
Patient He Never Treated, MED. ECON. (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/physician-found-liable-malpractice-
patient-he-never-treated. 
182. See id. 
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activities.187  These adverse reactions can range from nausea to 
the inability to operate a car or heavy equipment.188  To 
minimize these effects, patients must be warned about 
significant safety concerns and side effects that create a risk.189  
This information allows patients to choose whether to take the 
drug at a particular time or ensure they are used correctly.  But 
who should assume the obligation of providing patients with this 
information?190  The courts are split as to that question and lean 
towards a middle position of either making physicians 
responsible or placing the burden on patients themselves.191  
Litigation in which courts have had to decide a physician’s 
liability to a non-patient generally involves motor vehicular 
accidents and includes circumstances where a medicated patient 
negligently uses a car and causes an accident.192 
A. Cases That Have Allowed Recovery 
Courts that have allowed recovery tend to look at 
foreseeability as a key component in establishing a duty of care, 
or they state public policy is the overriding consideration making 
a physician responsible for the actions of the patient. 
1. Alabama 
The Alabama Supreme Court found that a duty was owed to 
an injured third party in a motor vehicle accident in Taylor v. 
Smith.193  The facts demonstrate that Ms. Ennis visited the 
defendant’s clinic for treatment of an opiate addiction.194  She 
was given methadone, but random testing showed that the 
 
187. See Cherie N. Wyatt, Driving the Center Line: Missouri Physicians’ 
Potential Liability to Third Persons for Failing to Warn of Medication Side 
Effects, 46 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 873      (2002). 
188. See Carol DerSarkissian, Drug Side Effects Explained, WEBMD 
(Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/drug-side-effects-
explained#1. 
189. See Michael Bihari, Why You Should Pay Attention to Black Box 
Warnings on Medication, VERYWELLHEALTH (Mar. 1, 2020), 
https://www.verywellhealth.com/black-box-warnings-1124107. 
190. See Wyatt, supra note 185, at 873. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887, 897 (Ala. 2004). 
194. Id. at 889. 
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patient was still using drugs.195  Following a treatment session, 
the patient left the clinic and drove home.196  Her car crossed 
into the opposite lane of travel and struck the automobile 
containing the plaintiff.197  A suit was filed by plaintiff against 
defendant-physician, claiming the defendant owed a duty to the 
plaintiff under ordinary negligence principles to not allow his 
impaired patient, who could not operate a motor vehicle 
responsibly, to be discharged.198 
The court noted that based upon the distance and frequency 
the patient traveled to the clinic and her continued drug abuse, 
a car accident was reasonably foreseeable.199  Thus, the issue 
was whether the head of a drug-treatment center owed a duty to 
a non-patient who was hurt in an accident with the patient when 
it was reasonably foreseeable that an accident can occur from 
the physician’s failure to use due care in giving methadone to 
the patient.200  In finding liability, the court stated “every person 
owes every other person a duty imposed by law to be careful not 
to hurt him,” and the court has often recognized a foreseeable 
duty to third parties based on a “obligation imposed in tort to act 
reasonably.”201  The court then examined other jurisdictions that 
imposed such a duty ondoctorsto benefit non-patient members of 
the driving public.202  As was explained: 
 
The possibility (or perhaps what could be called a 
threat) that in some case or cases in the future 
some therapists may choose not to accept some 
potential patients for therapy in their private 
practice . . . should not forever preclude victims of 
torts . . . referable to the breach of duty of such 
therapists from being without any remedy 
whatever.203 
 
195. Id. at 890. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 890–91. 
199. Id. at 892. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 893 (quoting Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence 
Hosp., 454 So. 2d 496, 502 (Ala. 1984)). 
202. Id. at 893–95. 
203. Id. at 896 (quoting Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 372 (Tex. App. 
1983)). 
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The alleged “nature of the defendant’s activity,” and the 
issuing of methadone on an outpatient basis without taking 
appropriate safeguards, “[are] affirmative act[s],” which place 
the administering doctor directly in the foreseeable results; this 
element, by itself, provides the incentive for imposing a duty.204 
2. Hawaii 
The Hawaii Supreme Court issued a mixed ruling in 
McKenzie v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, Inc.205  It 
determined a doctor did not owe a duty to a third party injured 
from prescribing medication that is not a controlled 
substance.206  However, a duty is imposed upon a physician to 
someone other than the patient to warn the patient a drug may 
affect that person’s driving capabilities if the patient could not 
have reasonably known the risk.207  This decision, which has 
been discussed by other jurisdictions, involved a patient who had 
a fainting episode from medication issued by the defendant 
while operating a car that struck the minor plaintiff.208 
The defendant argued that he owed no duty to the plaintiff 
because she was not his patient and that there was no special 
relationship with the patient that would require him to control 
that person’s behavior.209  The plaintiff countered that the 
pertinent issue is foreseeability, and public policy requires 
physicians to be held accountable for their prescribing 
practices.210  Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the 
defendant could be liable to the plaintiff because it is foreseeable 
that the patient would drive after taking negligently issued 
medication, subjecting them to harm.211  However, the 
Restatement merely describes a form of negligent conduct; it 
 
204. Id. at 896–97. 
205. McKenzie v. Haw. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 47 P.3d 1209 (Haw. 
2002). 
206. Id. at 1221. 
207. Id. at 1210. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 1211–12. 
210. Id. at 1212. 
211. Id. at 1213 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 (AM. L. 
INST. 1965)). 
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does not create a legal duty.212 
In ascertaining whether a duty is owed, the court must 
weigh the policy considerations that favor each party.  The 
plaintiff asserts that the fair distribution of the costs of harm 
and the need for objective compensation to those injured 
requires that health care providers owe a duty to non-patient 
third parties hurt due to negligent prescribing practices.213  
However, prescribing decisions require a weighing of the 
benefits and risks to a patient.214  In this regard, the threat of 
litigation should be sufficient to dissuade negligent prescribing 
decisions.215  Setting aside issues involving controlled 
substances, the court opined that “a physician does not owe a 
duty to non-patient third parties injured in an automobile 
accident caused by the patient’s adverse reaction to a medication 
negligently prescribed by the physician . . . where the negligence 
involves prescribing decisions.”216 
As for a physician’s negligent failure to warn a patient of a 
drug’s dangerous side-effects, such a warning could potentially 
avoid substantial harm to third parties.  “There is ‘little [social] 
utility in failing to warn patients about the effects of a drug or 
condition that are known to the physician but are likely to be 
unknown to the patient.’”217  Balancing the factors involved in 
imposing a duty to warn about the dangers of medication, logic 
imposes upon physicians, for the benefit of third parties, a duty 
to tell their patients that a drug may impair their driving ability 
“when such a duty would otherwise be owed to the patient.”218  
Factors to ponder in deciding whether the reasonable patient 
should have known of the risk include (1) understanding the risk 
as between laypersons and doctors; (2) whether the patient has 
previously taken the drug and/or suffered adverse effects; and 
(3) whether a warning would otherwise have been useless.219 
 
212. Id. at 1213–14 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302). 
213. Id. at 1212. 
214. Id. at 1216. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 1218. 
217. Id. at 1219 (quoting Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 
1998)). 
218. McKenzie, 47 P.3d at 1221. 
219. Id. at 1222. 
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3. Indiana 
Indiana has considered the issue of physician liability to 
third parties on several occasions.  In Cram v. Howell, the 
Indiana Supreme Court reversed the Indiana Court of Appeals, 
holding that a physician owes no duty to a third person allegedly 
harmed by the doctor’s treatment of a patient.220  Years earlier, 
the court found that no malpractice liability was established 
against a physician who had prescribed anabolic steroids to a 
patient who developed a toxic psychosis from the drug that 
caused him to shoot a third party.221  The court used a balancing 
test to make this determination.222  Generally, physicians do not 
owe a duty to a non-patient injured by the doctor’s treatment of 
a patient.  However, this pronouncement does provide 
physicians with complete immunity against third person claims.  
Liability may attach under the proper factual situation.223  The 
case presented facts that implied the defendant had actual 
knowledge that his immunizations caused a recurrent loss of 
consciousness in the patient.224  This knowledge makes it likely 
that the patient, if permitted to drive, would injure a third 
party.225  From a public policy point of view, the defendant 
should have observed his patient for an appropriate time period 
before allowing him to leave the office, and the physician failed 
to warn the patient of the risks linked to operating a vehicle in 
such a state.226 
This logic was reinforced in Manley v. Sherer.227  In that 
case, the plaintiff was involved in a car accident when the 
defendant’s patient lost consciousness while driving because of 
a medical condition and pharmaceuticals prescribed by the 
physician.228  While the plaintiff had no special relationship with 
the defendant, it was reasonably foreseeable that the patient 
could lose consciousness while driving and pose a danger to 
 
220. Cram v. Howell, 680 N.E.2d 1096, 1096 (Ind. 1997). 
221. Id. at 1097 (citing Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1997)). 
222. Id. at 1097 (citing Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 997)). 
223. Id. at 1097–98. 
224. Id. at 1098. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. See Manley v. Sherer, 960 N.E.2d 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 
228. Id. at 819. 
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others with her medical condition and prescribed medication.229  
Public policy considerations also warrant the imposition of a 
duty to warn since it will benefit both similarly-situated patients 
and third parties who may encounter those patients on the 
highway.230 
4. New York 
New York considered a physician’s liability to a third party 
in Davis v. South Nassau Community Hospital.231  This matter 
involved a patient who was given a narcotic pain-killer by the 
defendant without notice that the medication could impair her 
ability to drive.232  Soon after she left the defendant’s facility, 
while allegedly impaired by the drug, she was involved in an 
accident when she struck a bus driven by the plaintiff.233  The 
court phrased the issue as to whether the defendant owed a duty 
to the plaintiff to warn the patient that the drugs the physician 
gave her either impaired or could have impaired her ability to 
operate a motor vehicle properly.234 
In finding that such a duty exists, the court noted that it has 
“historically proceeded carefully and with reluctance to expand 
an existing duty of care.”235  However, in limited situations, the 
court has enlarged the duty of a treating physician to include a 
third party whose personal injury stemmed from the doctor’s 
performance of the duty of care owed to the patient.236  In this 
matter, the physician’s “relationship with . . . the tortfeasor . . . 
place[s] [him] in the [most advantageous] position to [safeguard] 
against the risk of harm.”237  When one weighs the elements 
“such as the expectations of the parties and society . . . tilts in 
favor of establishing a duty running from defendants to 
plaintiffs under the facts alleged in this case.”238  Giving the drug 
 
229. Id. at 822. 
230. Id. at 822–23. 
231. Davis v. S. Nassau Communities Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 614 (N.Y. 2015). 
232. Id. at 616. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 619 (citation omitted). 
236. Id. at 621. 
237. Id. at 622 (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 
1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001)). 
238. Id. 
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at issue without warning the patient about the medication’s 
ability to confuse created a danger affecting every motorist in 
the patient’s locale.239  The physician is the only party who could 
have delivered an appropriate admonition of the effects of that 
prescription.240  Therefore, the defendant had an obligation to 
the plaintiff to warn the patient that the medication reduced her 
ability to safely operate a car.241 
5. South Carolina 
Hardee v. Bio-Medical Applications of South Carolina, Inc. 
involved a patient who was returning home from dialysis when 
he lost control of her car and collided with the plaintiff.242  It was 
alleged that the defendant failed to inform the patient of the ill 
effects from the dialysis treatment—he was suffering from low 
blood sugar at the time the patient left the defendant’s office, 
and the medical staff failed to complete the normal post-
treatment tests before releasing the individual.243 
The court reversed the defendant’s grant of summary 
judgment and found that a doctor-patient relationship is not 
necessary in every claim against a medical provider, and a 
physician’s malpractice in treating a patient may provide the 
foundation of such an action by a third person in limited 
circumstances.244  A physician has a duty to warn of the risks 
involved with medical care.  A medical provider who offers 
treatment which may adversely influence a patient’s abilities 
owes a duty to avoid harm to the patient and to reasonably 
identifiable third parties by notifying the patient of the risks 
before dispensing treatment.245  Therefore, if the physician knew 
that the patient could suffer harmful effects subsequent to 
dialysis, the defendant owed a duty to a third party to warn the 





242. Hardee v. Bio-Medical Applications of S.C., Inc., 636 S.E.2d 629, 630 
(S.C. 2006). 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 632. 
245. Id. at 631–32. 
246. Id. at 632. 
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6. Tennessee 
Burroughs v. Magee involved a fatal motor vehicle accident 
when a truck driver ran a stop sign and collided with the 
plaintiff’s car.247  Mrs. Burroughs was seriously injured, and her 
husband was killed.248  The day before the incident, the truck 
driver had visited the defendant for persistent headaches, and 
the doctor had prescribed various medications that depress the 
nervous system and affect a person’s ability to drive.249  The 
plaintiffs sued, claiming that the defendant was negligent in 
failing to properly review the truck driver’s medical history 
outlined in the medical chart.250  It was asserted that: (1) the 
truck driver had a known history of Soma abuse, an addictive 
and potentially dangerous muscle relaxer, and the physician 
was negligent in prescribing that medication; and (2) the 
defendant negligently failed to warn his patient against 
operating a vehicle while taking the drug.251  The trial court 
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the 
matter ended up before the Tennessee Supreme Court.252 
The court used a complex analysis to determine that the 
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiffs to warn his patient of the 
dangers of driving while under the influence of the prescribed 
medication.253  However, it then found that the physician had no 
duty to the plaintiffs in the determination of whether to give the 
medications to the patient.254  The court applied a multiple 
pronged approach in reaching its decision.255  The first step is to 
determine the foreseeability of the harm.256  The defendant’s 
office was well aware of the patient’s abuse of prescription drugs, 
as evidenced by the comments in the medical records.257  
Therefore, the accident was foreseeable.258  The second factor is 
 




251. Id. at 327. 
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253. Id. at 331–33. 
254. Id. at 335. 
255. Id. at 331–33. 
256. Id. at 331. 
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“the possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury[.]”259  As 
demonstrated by accidents involving intoxicated drivers, “the 
possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury” that might 
happen from not warning a patient of the potential side-effects 
of medication on a patient’s ability to drive safely is 
substantial.260  The third element is “the importance or social 
value of the activity engaged in by defendant[.]”261  The 
providing of medical care is of the utmost importance both to the 
patient and to society.262  The next factor is “the usefulness of 
the conduct to defendant[.]”263  There is no benefit to the patient 
in failing to follow a warning about the medication.264  The last 
consideration is “the feasibility of alternative, safer conduct and 
the relative costs and burdens associated with that conduct; the 
relative usefulness of the safer conduct[.]”265  The most 
straightforward approach would be to warn the patient of the 
medication’s side-effects on the patient’s capacity to safely 
operate a car.266  These factors’ totality demonstrates that the 
defendant owed a duty to both the patient and injured third 
parties concerning the danger to operate a vehicle safely while 
taking the drugs.267 
The court then examined whether the defendant owed a 
duty to the plaintiffs as members of the motoring public in 
formulating the decision to issue the medication to the 
patient.268  This question can only be answered by considering 
public policy factors.  The judges looked at similar cases in 
Indiana and Hawaii that declined to find that a doctor owed a 
non-patient plaintiff a duty of care.269  After all, the doctor’s 
primary loyalty must be to the patient.270  Forcing a physician 
to predict a patient’s behavioral reaction to a drug and to 
 





264. Id. at 332–33. 




269. Id. at 334–35. 
270. Id. at 334. 
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consider possible plaintiffs would divide that fidelity.271  The 
physician’s duty must remain with the patient when medication 
is prescribed.272  Likewise, doctors and patients must 
contemplate factors like “cost-effectiveness, and availability of 
insurance coverage in prescribing decisions.”273  Weighing the 
social utility of pharmaceuticals and the many issues that must 
be considered in prescribing choices, existing tort law should be 
enough to discourage careless prescribing decisions.274  Imposing 
a duty to warn may decrease the risk to third parties, but there 
is no rational, sound, or persuasive justification to add the risk 
of tort liability to non-patient third parties injured in car 
accidents.275 
7. Utah 
B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West presented the issue of whether a 
physician owed a duty to a non-patient to exercise reasonable 
care in providing medication that poses “a risk of injury to third 
parties.”276  This tragic matter involved a nurse practitioner who 
gave her patient a cocktail of medications which were in his 
system at the time he shot and killed his wife.277  The 
“[d]efendant[] [maintained] that healthcare providers owe no 
duty to a [third party] who has been injured by a patient unless 
. . . the provider has custody or control of the patient, or where 
the physician is on notice that the patient is uniquely dangerous 
to [identified] third parties.”278 
The court noted that cases in the state demonstrate that a 
healthcare provider is not obligated to control a patient’s 
independent conduct.279  Such cases also do not support the 
defendant’s position that a healthcare provider may negligently 
prescribe medication that results in a patient harming a third 
party.280  A doctor-patient relationship is not necessary to 
 
271. Id. (citing Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991)). 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 335. 
275. Id. 
276. B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 275 P.3d 228, 229 (Utah 2012). 
277. Id. at 229–30. 
278. Id. at 230–31. 
279. Id. at 233. 
280. Id. 
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support a physician’s duty to a third person.281  There are other 
factors that impose a duty upon a physician to use care when 
prescribing medication.282  Generally, there is a duty to exercise 
reasonable care when involved in conduct that creates a risk of 
harm to others, including a health care provider prescribing 
drugs to a patient.283  After all, the doctor is better positioned to 
use reasonable care in prescribing medication so that patients 
do not pose an unreasonable risk of injury to others.284  While 
prescribing medication has substantial social value, 
pharmaceuticals’ utility is not enough to justify the disavowal of 
a duty to use proper care in prescribing them.285 
B. Cases That Have Not Allowed Recovery 
Most cases that refuse to impose liability do so because 
there is no privilege between the doctor and injured third party, 
and the courts refuse to expand physician liability to third 
parties on public policy grounds.286 
1. Connecticut 
Connecticut ruled that a physician does not owe a duty to 
an injured third party in Jarmie v. Troncale.287  The defendant 
is a gastroenterologist who treated a patient for hepatic 
encephalopathy.288  That individual lost consciousness and 
crashed into the plaintiff’s vehicle causing significant injuries.289  
Suit was filed against the physician, claiming he failed to warn 
the patient not to drive.290  The claim was dismissed and upheld 
on appeal.291 
The plaintiff asserted that the duty to inform was owed and 
 
281. Id. at 233–34. 
282. Id. at 234. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 236–37. 
285. Id. at 237. 
286. Id. at 231–32 (citing Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 
2005)). 
287. Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802, 826 (Conn. 2012). 
288. Id. at 804. 
289. Id. at 805. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 805, 828. 
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that applying the rule to injured third parties is consistent with 
state law.292  The defense countered that Connecticut does not 
recognize a duty owed to unidentifiable members of society.293  
The court agreed with the defense and noted the state’s law does 
not support such a claim because the plaintiff was an 
“unidentifiable victim, [thus] public policy considerations 
counsel against it, and there is no consensus among courts in 
other jurisdictions, which have considered the issue only 
rarely.”294  “Absent a special relationship” dealing with custody 
or control, no duty is present to safeguard a third party from the 
actions of another; in fact, the Connecticut courts have used 
restraint when given the chance to extend a health care 
provider’s obligation to those not their patients.295  Even if it was 
foreseeable that the patient might have caused an accident, the 
plaintiff was not part of an identifiable group of victims.296  
Finally, imposing liability on physicians under the 
circumstances would establish a considerable risk of influencing 
conduct in undesirable ways because it would obstruct the 
doctor-patient relationship and cause increased lawsuits.297 
2. Florida 
In Werner v. Varner, Stafford & Seaman, P.A., the plaintiff 
was hurt in a rear-end car accident when his vehicle was struck 
by an individual who suffered a seizure while driving.298  The 
plaintiff sought to find the doctor liable for his failure to warn 
the patient to avoid driving while taking anti-epileptic 
medication.299  The court ruled there could be no viable cause of 
action because the plaintiff was “neither known nor identifiable 
to [the defendant]” and was merely a member “of the driving 
public at large.”300  Even if the court assumed the doctor had a 
duty to warn his patient, there is no allegation that physician’s 
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295. Id. at 810–11. 
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failure to warn the patient not to operate her car while 
medicated proximately caused the incident.301  The complaint 
itself failed to contain any allegations that the accident 
happened while the patient was medicated or that the physician 
had the duty to warn his patient not to drive because of his 
epileptic condition.302 
3. Georgia 
In 2020, Georgia addressed the issue in Stanley v. Garrett 
and found that no duty was created to a third person because 
that individual was not a patient of the physician.303  The facts 
reveal the defendant was treating a patient for alcoholism; that 
person then killed the plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident while 
intoxicated.304  Suit was filed against the physician for 
negligence in treating the patient and failing to prevent him 
from driving despite meeting with him a few hours before the 
collision.305  The court disagreed and noted there is no legal duty 
“to control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from 
causing physical harm to others.”306  More specifically, a 
physician has no duty to exercise control over another unless 
there is a special relationship between the actor and another 
creating a duty upon the actor to control that individual’s actions 
to benefit a third person.307 
This determination requires a two-part test: (1) the doctor 
must have control over the patient; and (2) the physician must 
have known that the patient was expected to cause harm to 
others.308  Nevertheless, absent the legal ability to impose 
restrictions on the patient’s liberty, no duty to control arises.309  
There is also nothing in Georgia law that would allow the doctor 
to commit the patient for involuntary treatment because the 
 
301. Id. at 1311. 
302. Id. 
303. Stanley v. Garrett, 848 S.E.2d 890, 895–96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). 
304. Id. at 892. 
305. Id. at 892–93. 
306. Id. at 894 n.13 (citing SecureAlert, Inc. v. Boggs, 815 S.E.2d 156, 161 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2018)). 
307. Id. at 894 (citation omitted). 
308. Id. at 894–95 (citation omitted). 
309. Id. at 895 (citing Houston v. Bedgood, 588 S.E.2d 437, 440 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003)). 
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patient was under the influence of alcohol.310  A malpractice 
claim also mandates there must be a doctor-patient relationship 
with the claimant; that relationship is not present with a third 
party who is injured by the actions of the patient.311 
The decedent’s estate sued the psychiatrist who was 
treating the driver for alcoholism and depression.312  The facts 
show that the patent had consumed alcohol both before and after 
an emergency meeting with the defendant on the day of the 
accident.313  The plaintiff alleged that the physician was 
negligent in his treatment and owed a duty to prevent the 
patient from driving that day.314 
The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the 
claim and noted that as a general rule, there is no duty to 
“control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from 
causing physical harm to others.”315  The plaintiff pointed to no 
precedent to support the assertion that a physician must start 
involuntary treatment of a patient any time there is reason to 
think a patient is under the influence of alcohol.316  Implicitly, 
the plaintiff asserts that the court should construe the state’s 
involuntary treatment statute as analogous to a dram-shop act 
but for physicians.317  However, the court has previously refused 
to find that the duty of a health care provider to the public is 
similar to that imposed upon alcohol providers.318  Georgia law 
also requires physician-patient privity to bring a malpractice 
claim, and it is undisputed that the decedent third party was not 
the defendant’s patient.319 
4. Iowa 
In Kolbe v. State, the Iowa Supreme Court found a physician 
owed no duty to the public because of a patient’s negligent 
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driving.320  The plaintiff was struck while riding his bicycle by a 
man operating a car with significant vision impairment; the 
defendants were two physicians who had notified the 
Department of Transportation several years apart that the 
motorist could drive with restrictions.321  The trial judge granted 
the physicians’ summary judgment motion, and this appealed 
followed.322 
The main issue on review was: 
 
whether a physician owes a duty to persons not 
within the physician/patient relationship.  
Specifically, [the court focused on] whether 
physicians owe a duty to unknown third parties 
when rendering an opinion to the Iowa 
Department of Transportation regarding a 
patient’s competency to drive. 323 
 
The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts and noted 
no duty exists to control the actions of a third party to stop him 
from inflicting harm to another unless: “(a) a special relation 
exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a 
duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) 
a special relation exists between the actor and the other which 
gives to the other a right to protection.”324 
The plaintiffs claimed that the certifying physicians had a 
duty to protect the public from any danger the motorist 
presented to others.325  The court retorted that not only is there 
a lack of privity, but there is no special relationship between the 
physicians and the plaintiffs “that is sufficiently close and direct 
to support a legal claim against the physicians for [their] 
injuries.”326  Furthermore, the defendants were not responsible 
for issuing the driver’s license.327  That determination was 
 
320. Kolbe v. State, 661 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003). 
321. Id. at 144–45. 
322. Id. at 145. 
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rendered by the Iowa Department of Transportation, and the 
opinions of the doctors were only one factor in that decision.328  
From a public policy point of view, it is not the physician’s 
responsibility to safeguard all third parties who might come into 
contact with a physician’s patient.  Forcing a duty upon health 
care providers under the circumstances would intrude upon the 
physician’s main responsibility—treating the patient.329  
Doctors must be permitted to satisfy their obligations to a 
patient without apprehension of third-party liability claims for 
a patient’s actions over which they have no control.330 
5. Kansas 
In Calwell v. Hassen, the Kansas Supreme Court was asked 
to decide whether a physician owed a duty to an injured bicyclist 
arising from his failure to warn the patient not to drive.331  The 
plaintiff was injured in an accident when a woman who suffered 
from drowsiness fell asleep while driving.332  The defendant 
treated her for the sleep disorder and never informed the patient 
that she should refrain from operating an automobile.333  The 
Court of Appeals found that under § 315 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, the doctor-patient relationship established a 
“special relationship” and “there may have been a duty to warn 
[the patient] not to drive.”334 
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed this determination.335  
Not one of its prior rulings involved a “special relationship” 
between a doctor and patient.336  In this case, the special 
relationship is between the doctor and the patient, not the doctor 
and injured plaintiff.337  Furthermore, the patient already knew 
of her sleeping problem and understood that she should pull over 
 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 149 (citing Est. of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 676 A.2d 1223, 1225 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)). 
330. Id. 150. 
331. Calwell v. Hassan, 925 P.2d 422, 424 (Kan. 1996). 
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334. Id. at 427 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. L. INST. 
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336. Id. at 429. 
337. Id. at 431. 
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if she felt drowsy while driving.338  There was also no showing 
that the medication given to the patient caused or aggravated 
her drowsiness problem.339 
Just providing care to another does not by itself create 
liability.  That care must be such that the physician should 
recognize it as being needed to protect a third person.340  The 
court refused to impose a duty upon physicians to warn a patient 
of something the person already knows.  The defendant did 
nothing to increase the risk of harm, so no duty was owed the 
plaintiff.341 
6. Massachusetts 
Massachusetts has a bifurcated position in that it imposes 
a duty upon the physician to third parties injured from 
medication use but not from liability related to the treatment of 
a medical condition.342  This dual position is explained in Medina 
v. Hochberg,343 which involved a patient who suffered a seizure 
while driving and struck the plaintiff as he was exiting his car.344  
The injured plaintiff sued the treating doctor asserting that he 
owed a duty to the patient to control his behavior because a 
special relationship of doctor-patient existed.345  In the 
alternative, it was alleged that the physician violated the duty 
owed to the plaintiff by failing to warn the patient not to drive.346 
The court ruled that the defendant did not owe a duty to the 
plaintiff under ordinary negligence principles.347  It also refused 
to extend the narrow principle announced in Coombes v. 
Florio,348 that a doctor “owes a limited duty to third parties, 
foreseeably at risk from a patient’s decision to operate a motor 




340. Id. at 432 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. L. 
INST. 1965)). 
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343. Id. at 1208. 
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medications the physician has prescribed that might impair the 
patient’s ability as a motorist.”349  In some matters, a physician 
may have a duty to warn a patient of the dangers attendant to 
their treatment.350  This would include telling the person of 
symptoms reasonably likely to occur from treatment that would 
make it unsafe to engage in activities such as driving.351  The 
duty of care may also mandate that a health care provider notify 
a patient of the side effects of medication if it is determined that 
such information is necessary to the patient’s making an 
informed decision.352  However, the court will not extend the 
duty owed by physicians to the members of the public who may 
be harmed by a patient due to an underlying medical problem 
that the doctor is treating.353  Imposing such a duty would 
mandate warning patients about the risks related to driving 
based on any number of pre-existing health issues, none of which 
relate to the doctor’s active treatment of the patient.354  From a 
public policy and cost-benefit analysis, “weighing the benefits of 
such a duty against the countervailing costs of intruding into the 
highly personal, confidential physician-patient relationship” 
militates against imposing liability.355 
7. New Jersey 
In Vizzoni v. B.M.D., the New Jersey court declined to find 
that a prescribing physician “owes a duty to warn their patients 
of adverse side effects of medications for the benefit of third 
parties.”356  This matter involved a fatal motor vehicle accident 
caused by the defendant’s patient whose negligent driving was 
the result of prescription medication.357  The health care 
provider argued that he owed no duty to the decedent because 
 
349. Medina, 987 N.E.2d at 1208 (citing Coombes, 877 N.E.2d at 567). 
350. Id. at 1210. 
351. Id. (citing Vasa v. Compass Med., P.C., 921 N.E.2d 963, 965–66 
(Mass. 2010)). 
352. Id. (citing Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Mass. 
2002)). 
353. Id. 
354. Id. at 1211–12. 
355. Id. at 1212–13. 
356. Vizzoni v. B.M.D., 212 A.3d 962, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). 
357. Id. at 965. 
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she was not a readily identifiable victim.358  The trial judge 
agreed and opined that “many substances could render a driver 
sleepy and all of them are clearly marked with those kinds of 
warning[s].”359  This decision was upheld on appeal, where the 
court focused on foreseeability and fairness.360  The appellate 
court noted that New Jersey courts have acknowledged the 
obligation of a mental health professional to take reasonable 
actions to safeguard a readily recognizable victim placed in 
harm’s way by their patient.361  However, the court believed the 
proper “question is whether the defendant had a duty to act for 
the benefit of another but failed to do so.”362  The law requires a 
practitioner who issues medication that impairs the patient’s 
abilities thereby placing third parties at risk, to use reasonable 
care in making that decision, but that is not the issue.363  The 
proper inquiry is whether the consequences of giving medication 
was foreseeable to the prescriber.364  The court answered this 
question by ruling that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude 
that the drug caused the patient to strike the opposing car.365  
This decision was supported by reference to Massachusetts and 
Hawaii cases that found a prescribing physician cannot be found 
responsible for an injury caused by a patient unless the drug 
itself caused the harm.366 
In 2020, the New Jersey court reaffirmed this holding in 
Bland v. K.R., when it ruled that its reporting statute for 
seizures does not create an independent cause of action for 
negligence against a physician.367  The law merely establishes a 
mechanism for physicians to report to the Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles, a driver who suffers from seizures.368 
 
358. Id. at 967. 
359. Id. at 969. 
360. Id. at 977. 
361. Id. at 972. 
362. Id. at 973. 
363. Id. at 974. 
364. Id. 
365. Id. at 979. 
366. Id. at 978 (citing Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 567 (Mass. 2007); 
McKenzie v. Haw. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 47 P.3d 1209 (Haw. 2002)). 
367. Bland v. K.R., No. A-1837-18T1, 2020 WL 2510361, at *7–8 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. May 15, 2020). 
368. Id. at *7. 
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8. North Dakota 
The North Dakota Supreme Court entertained the question 
in 2019 and found that a physician has no duty to a third party 
due to the doctor’s failure to warn a patient about the risks of 
driving linked to a medical condition.369  In Cichos v. Dakota Eye 
Institute, P.C., a man drove his truck on a highway when he 
struck a horse-driven trailer killing one of five passengers and 
injuring others.370  Suit was filed against the truck driver, who 
then assigned his malpractice claim against the eye doctor to the 
plaintiffs.371  The issue was framed as “whether a physician in 
North Dakota owes a duty to third parties to warn a patient 
regarding vision impairments to driving.”372  The facts show that 
the driver was legally blind, and a doctor at the defendant’s 
clinic issued a certificate of blindness and told the patient not to 
drive.373  Several weeks later, another doctor employed by the 
defendant examined the man and said that his vision had 
improved and told him that he could drive with restrictions.374  
The plaintiffs claimed that while his vision had gotten better, it 
was still below the minimum vision required to operate a vehicle 
and that the defendant owed a duty to the injured parties to 
warn the patient about the status of his vision.375  However, 
whether to impose a physician’s duty to an injured third party 
who is not a patient is a controversy that has smoldered as the 
medical and legal communities struggle over whether policy and 
fairness considerations mandate the expansion of the law to 
impose liability upon a health care provider for injuries 
sustained by a third party that are foreseeable. 
The court denied the claim and noted that they were 
unimpressed with the cases cited by the plaintiffs because they 
involved the administering of medication to patients.376  This 
dispute merely involved an eye examination.377  In the cases 
around the country dealing with the issue, the courts are split 
 
369. Cichos v. Dakota Eye Inst., P.C., 933 N.W.2d 452, 459 (N.D. 2019). 
370. Id. at 454. 
371. Id. at 455. 
372. Id. at 454. 
373. Id. at 454–55. 
374. Id. at 455. 
375. Id. 
376. Id. at 458–59. 
377. Id. at 454–55. 
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on whether a duty is owed.378  The North Dakota court was 
persuaded by the cases that found no third party duty existed on 
public policy grounds.379  Those decisions were then summarized 
and adopted without much additional explanation other than 
the court’s concluding that “a physician has no duty to third 
parties arising from the physician’s failure to warn a patient 
about driving risks resulting from the patient’s medical 
condition.”380 
9. Oklahoma 
In Tucker v. Lam, a woman was injured in the doctor’s 
parking lot by a patient placed in her car by a member of the 
physician’s staff allegedly knowing she was incapable of 
driving.381  The patient then struck the plaintiff with her 
automobile in a lot. The lawsuit against the physician was 
premised upon “her status as an invitee under principles of 
common law premises liability.”382  In denying the plaintiff’s 
claim, the court noted that “[j]ust because the defendant has 
created a risk which harmed the plaintiff . . . does not mean that, 
in the absence of some duty to the plaintiff, the defendant will 
be held liable.”383 
Oklahoma law acknowledges that an individual “may have 
a duty to an injured party where a special relationship exists 
between that person and the third person.”384  This will occur 
when the defendant has “‘special knowledge about the third 
person and control over that third person,’” and the defendant 
has power over some subject related to that third person; or 
because of a special situation that “‘reasonably give[s] notice to 
that person relative to a third person.’”385  In this matter, the 
defendant had no control over the patient.386  Therefore, the 
proper issue is “whether special circumstances existed that 
 
378. Id. at 455. 
379. Id. 
380. Id. at 459. 
381. Tucker v. Lam, 313 P.3d 1011, 1012 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013). 
382. Id. at 1013. 
383. Id. (citation omitted). 
384. Id. at 1014 (citation omitted). 
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reasonably gave [the defendant] notice that” the plaintiff would 
be harmed from the patient’s driving her car.387  The fact that 
the patient was unsteady on her feet did not put the defendant 
on notice that she would cause an accident.388  Many people drive 
a vehicle despite limitations that make it difficult to walk.389  
Therefore, no evidence existed that placed the defendant on 
notice that circumstances were present that would impose a 
special duty on the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the 
harm caused by the patient.390 
10. Pennsylvania 
Several Pennsylvania decisions have refused to impose 
liability on physicians for failure to stop impaired patients from 
driving.391  For example, in Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, the 
issue was whether an ophthalmologist might be held liable to a 
third person where the physician failed to notify his patient or 
the Department of Transportation of the patient’s limited vision, 
and the individual then injured another while driving.392  The 
court refused to impose a duty upon the physician under the 
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code or Regulations, noting that 
neither “expressly or implicitly provide” for a private cause of 
action for the failure to report a vision problem.393  The Code only 
requires physicians and others to supply the state with 
information on those diagnosed as having a medical condition 
determined to affect a person’s ability to drive.394  That 
notification then triggers a state investigation “and possible 
further action to suspend the driver’s license.”395 
As to whether the reporting statute impliedly provides a 
private remedy is subject to a three-part analysis: (1) “does the 
statute create a . . . right in favor of plaintiff;” (2) “is there any 
indication of [a] legislative intent” to create a private remedy; 
 
387. Id. 
388. Id. at 1015. 
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391. See 3 WEST’S PA. PRAC., TORTS: LAW AND ADVOCACY Liability of 
Physicians to Non-Patients § 7.6, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020). 
392. Est. of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 624 (Pa. 1999). 
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and, (3) is it harmonious with the purposes of the law to “imply 
such a remedy for the plaintiff?”396  The statute’s intent is to 
obtain information about licensed drivers rather than any 
association between third parties and physicians.  One may 
maintain that a private remedy would inspire physicians to 
notify the Driver’s Bureau of any disorders, but that policy 
concern is better left to the legislature.397  An independent cause 
of action is inconsistent with the “purpose or spirit of the Motor 
Vehicle Code.”398  Also, “[i]t may be reasonably foreseeable that 
a patient exposed to an infectious and communicable disease . . 
. will injure a third party unless properly informed to prevent 
the spread of the disease.”399  However, it is an unreasonable 
expansion of duty and foreseeability to expand a doctor’s duty to 
a patient and “hold a physician liable to the public at large” 
based upon the facts of this case.400  This is particularly true 
when a physician “did not cause or aggravate a medical 
condition that affected the patient’s driving,” and the patient is 
aware of that medical condition.401  An injured third party is 
simply not a foreseeable victim that the court will recognize, nor 
extend foreseeability outside the point of recognition, for to do so 
will make liability boundless.402  The court “will not 
countenance” this result.403 
11. Texas 
A Texas court in 1983 determined that under the proper 
circumstance, a physician may owe a duty to use reasonable care 
to safeguard the driving public “where the physician’s 
negligence in diagnosis or treatment of a patient contributes to 
plaintiff’s injuries.”404  However, that ruling was subsequently 
modified in Helms v. Gonzalez, which involved a fatal car 
accident when a methadone patient fell asleep at the wheel.405  
 
396. Id. (citation omitted). 
397. Id. at 627 (citing 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 1518(b)). 
398. Id. 





404. Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Tex. App. 1983). 
405. Helms v. Gonzalez, 885 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. App. 1994). 
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The victims filed suit against the doctor who treated the addict 
but the evidence revealed that the defendant fulfilled his duty to 
warn of the drug’s side effects, including insomnia, drowsiness, 
and faintness, and dizziness.406  Therefore, the defendant 
satisfied his duty to warn the patient about the side effects of 
methadone, the physician had no obligation to stop the patient 
from driving, and he was not negligent in connection with the 
car accident.407 
Likewise, in Praesel v. Johnson, the Texas Supreme Court 
found no duty existed to warn an epileptic patient not to operate 
a car or to report the patient’s condition to the state’s licensing 
authority.408  Physicians are permitted but not required to notify 
the Department of Public Safety or the Medical Advisory Board 
of the identity of a patient “whom the physician has diagnosed 
as having a disorder specified in a rule of the Department.”409  
However, the patient’s license is not automatically revoked.410  
“The Board can recommend that a driver be permitted to retain 
a license even if there has been a seizure within three years.”411  
Therefore, the law offers no sensible reason for imposing a 
negligence per se standard for “failing to report an epileptic 
seizure to state licensing authorities.”412 
In deciding whether to compel a common-law obligation, the 
court will consider the “social, economic, and political questions 
and their application to the facts at hand.”413  Balancing the 
usefulness of issuing a warning to a patient not to drive who 
already knows that he suffers from seizures “against the burden 
of liability to third parties . . . is incremental but that the 
consequences of imposing a duty [upon a physician] are great.”414  
The accountability for the proper use of a vehicle should stay 
primarily with the driver, who can determine whether it is 




408. Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1998). 
409. Id. at 394 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 12.096(a) 
(West 2001)). 
410. Id. at 395. 
411. Id. (citing 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE. § 15.58 (1976)). 
412. Id. at 396. 
413. Id. at 397 (citation omitted). 
414. Id. at 398. 
48https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/4
2021 LIABILITY OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 197 
seizures have happened.415  Therefore, the court will not impose 
on doctors a duty to third parties to warn an individual with 
epilepsy not to operate a car.416 
V. CONCLUSION 
Duty of care is a critical component of any negligence claim 
to create liability.  It is well recognized at common law that a 
physician owes a duty to advise a patient but is not mandated to 
take affirmative measures outside the physician-patient 
relationship to protect a third-party.  Health care providers may 
also be responsible for oversight, or the failure to safeguard a 
patient, due to a special relationship of care they undertake, 
such as failing to correctly diagnose or recommend a proper 
treatment plan.  Recently, the courts have struggled over 
whether public policy and fairness require the expansion of the 
law to impose liability upon a health care provider for injuries 
sustained by a third party that are foreseeable. 
The first deviation from the common law occurred when the 
court imposed a duty upon a mental health professional to a 
third person when the analyst learns that a patient will harm a 
specific person.417  This was followed by an expansion of liability 
when a third party is exposed to a communicable disease due to 
the doctor’s failure to report the positive results or negligently 
explain the test’s outcome.  The courts have occasionally found 
that doctors owe a duty to inform third parties of a genetic trait 
possessed by a relative or hold independent medical examiners 
liable for those they examine on behalf of an insurance company, 
employer or attorney. 
The most recent attempt to expand physician liability 
involves injuries sustained by innocent third parties in motor 
vehicle accidents due to a patient’s medical condition or adverse 
medication reaction.  Various theories are advanced to establish 
liability, such as the physician was negligent by violating a 
statute created to protect the public through negligence per se, 
establishing prima facie negligence, or offering evidence of 
carelessness.  No clear consensus has emerged as to whether the 




417. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
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cases that refuse to impose liability do so because there is no 
privity between the doctor and injured third party, or they refuse 
to create a duty to third parties on public policy grounds.  Courts 
that have allowed recovery look at foreseeability as a critical 
consideration in establishing a duty of care or feel that public 
policy is the overriding factor that makes a physician liable for 
the patient’s actions. 
These assaults on the common law will not abate.  Litigation 
is a way of life and enterprising attorneys will continue to 
advance theories in an attempt to find physicians liable to third 
parties as the result of the misconduct of their patients.  As the 
split in the court rulings show, the proper determination is in 
the eyes of the beholder and there are valid points in both 
positions. 
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